Legislation introduced by Rep. Pat Harrigan of North Carolina and backed in the Senate by Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas would bar Chinese, Russian, Iranian, North Korean and Cuban nationals from all 17 Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories unless a waiver is granted by the secretary of energy in consultation with the agency's intelligence office.
The bill, known as the Guarding America's Technology and Energy (GATE) Act, requires the DOE and the FBI to notify Congress within 30 days whenever a waiver is issued. It also mandates that any existing clearance for a covered foreign national be revoked unless the waiver meets a strict "outweighs the national security and economic risks" test.
DOE labs are a cornerstone of U.S. research, handling everything from nuclear weapons stewardship to advanced materials, quantum computing and clean‑energy technologies. The facilities employ more than 100 000 scientists, engineers and support staff and receive billions of dollars in federal funding each year. Because of their dual‑use nature, they have long been a focus of counter‑intelligence attention.
Senate Intelligence Committee data released earlier this year showed that roughly 40 000 foreign citizens accessed DOE labs in fiscal year 2023, including more than 8 000 from China and Russia. Sen. Joni Ernst of Iowa warned that China has been "actively recruiting scientists from national labs to work on their own military programs and stealing our research using visiting students and scholars." She added that several hundred Iranian nationals also gained access during the same period.
Those figures echo a broader pattern documented by the Biden administration, which reported that between September 2021 and August 2024, 28 028 Chinese nationals, 304 Iranians and 1 608 Russians visited DOE facilities. The administration's own statistics indicate that in fiscal year 2025 alone, about 1 900 Chinese citizens made short‑term visits while another 1 300 held long‑term research assignments, and roughly 2 100 were formally employed at the labs.
Support for the GATE Act appears to cross party lines. Republicans have repeatedly highlighted the risk of technology transfer to strategic competitors, while some Democrats have expressed concern about the adequacy of existing safeguards. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce, which has jurisdiction over the DOE, scheduled a markup of the bill for next week, and the Senate Armed Services Committee is expected to hold a hearing on the Senate companion.
Proponents argue that the legislation closes a loophole that allows foreign nationals to work side‑by‑side with American scientists on projects that could be repurposed for military use. "America's national laboratories are home to some of the most sensitive and valuable research in the world, and the same countries working to steal American technology should not have routine access to the facilities developing it," Harrigan said in an interview.
Critics, including several university leaders and research advocacy groups, warn that the bill could hamper legitimate scientific exchange and slow progress on climate and energy research that often relies on international collaboration. They point to existing vetting processes, such as the DOE's Personnel Security Program, which already requires background checks and sponsor approvals for foreign visitors.
Former undersecretary of energy for science Paul Dabbar, who served from 2017 to 2021, cautioned that the Chinese Communist Party has "woven itself into the U.S. government's research and innovation efforts," suggesting that current safeguards are insufficient. He and other security officials have called for a more robust inter‑agency review that includes the Department of Defense and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
In Canada, the federal government operates a network of national research facilities that collaborate closely with their U.S. counterparts on projects ranging from particle physics to renewable energy. Canadian officials have noted that any restriction on foreign access to U.S. labs could have ripple effects on joint programs, especially those funded through the Canada‑U.S. Energy Research Partnership. While Canada does not have a formal equivalent to the GATE Act, the Department of National Defence has recently tightened its own foreign‑visitor protocols, citing similar concerns.
The legislative push follows a series of earlier measures aimed at curbing foreign influence in American science. The 2022 "Export Control Reform Act" expanded the Commerce Department's authority to restrict the transfer of emerging technologies, and the Department of Justice's "China Initiative" pursued criminal cases against individuals suspected of illicit technology transfer. However, those efforts have faced criticism for overreach and for creating a chilling effect on legitimate academic work.
Procedurally, the GATE Act would amend the DOE's existing access regulations. Under the proposed language, a waiver could be granted only after a written determination that the scientific benefit outweighs the identified security risk. The determination would have to be signed by the secretary of energy and the director of the Office of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, and the waiver would be limited in scope and duration.
If the House passes the bill, it will move to the Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, where it is likely to be paired with the companion measure sponsored by Sen. Cotton. The Senate version contains similar waiver provisions but adds a requirement that the Office of the Director of National Intelligence submit an annual report on foreign access trends to the full Senate.
Both chambers will need to reconcile any differences before the legislation can be sent to the White House for signature. The Biden administration has not yet issued a formal position, but a senior Energy Department official told reporters that the agency is reviewing the bill's impact on ongoing research collaborations.
Should the GATE Act become law, it would represent the most sweeping restriction on foreign access to U.S. national labs in a decade. The change could force universities and private firms that rely on DOE facilities to re‑evaluate partnerships with scholars from the five listed countries, potentially shifting a portion of research activity to other venues.
Lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have signaled that they will monitor the bill's implementation closely, with the expectation that any waiver process will be transparent and subject to congressional oversight. As the debate unfolds, the balance between protecting national security and preserving the open scientific environment that has long driven American innovation will remain a central point of contention.