In a book released to mark the 25th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, journalist Peter Bergen argues that the United States has pursued a fundamentally flawed war on terror under every president since George W. Bush. The 401‑page volume, published by W.W. Norton, lays out what Bergen sees as a pattern of strategic missteps, costly expansions and missed opportunities that have left the country with more than 7,000 dead service members and a price tag of roughly $6 trillion.
Bergen begins with a scathing assessment of the Bush administration. He contends that the president's team both downplayed al Qaeda's threat before September 11 and then failed to mount a coherent campaign afterward. The decision to open a second front in Iraq, just months after the invasion of Afghanistan, is portrayed as a diversion that weakened the original mission. While Bergen concedes that the 2007 "surge" in Iraq was a gamble that paid off, he still brands the initial invasion as a strategic error that set the stage for years of instability.
The book moves on to Barack Obama, whom Bergen describes as the "drone president." According to Bergen, the frequency of CIA‑run drone strikes in Pakistan rose from one every 61 days under Bush to one every four days in Obama's first two years. He also notes that Obama's counter‑terrorism footprint expanded to seven Muslim‑majority countries, including Libya, Somalia, Syria and Yemen. While the raid that killed Osama bin Laden is highlighted as a rare success, Bergen argues that the subsequent rise of the Islamic State forced the administration back into a protracted conflict that never fully ended.
Donald Trump's tenure is presented as a mixed record. Bergen credits Trump with overseeing the territorial defeat of the so‑called Islamic State caliphate, yet he criticizes the president's habit of labeling Latin American drug cartels as "terrorists" and his decision to launch a war in Iran on the basis of disputed intelligence. The author also calls the Trump‑era negotiations with the Taliban "the art of the giveaway," noting that the talks were conducted through Qatar, a country that has faced accusations of financing extremist groups.
The final chapter turns to Joe Biden, whose decision to withdraw U.S. forces from Afghanistan in August 2021 is portrayed as a "calamitous conclusion" to the two‑decade‑long effort. Bergen argues that the rapid pullout left diplomats and Afghan allies stranded, culminating in the deadly attack at Kabul's Abbey Gate. He draws a parallel to the United States' 1975 evacuation of Saigon, suggesting that the image of a chaotic exit will linger in the national memory for years.
Beyond the presidential critiques, Bergen's narrative raises broader questions about the institutional framework of the war on terror. The book notes that the Department of Defense's annual counter‑terrorism budget has swelled from a few hundred million dollars in the late 1990s to over $30 billion in recent years, a figure that competes with domestic priorities such as infrastructure and health care. In Canada, the parallel NATO commitment to Afghanistan cost Canadian taxpayers billions and sparked debate over the country's role in overseas conflicts. The Canadian experience, while smaller in scale, mirrors the American struggle to balance security objectives with public appetite for foreign engagements.
Critics of Bergen's work point out that his focus begins with George W. Bush, overlooking earlier presidential responses to terrorism. The 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the 1998 attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and the 2000 USS Cole bombing all occurred under Bill Clinton, who treated terrorism largely as a tactical problem rather than a strategic one. Even earlier, Lyndon B. Johnson faced the first hijacking by the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1968, an event that helped shape the modern counter‑terrorism apparatus. By not fully integrating these precedents, Bergen's account may miss how institutional memory shaped later decisions.
The book also sidesteps a deep dive into the ideological motivations of jihadist groups. Bergen uses the terms "jihadists" and "Islamists" but offers little explanation of the theological and political currents that drive these movements. Understanding that motivation is essential for policymakers who must design strategies that go beyond kinetic operations. In the United States, debates over the root causes of radicalization have informed recent congressional hearings on domestic extremism and have influenced Canadian discussions about community‑based prevention programs.
In terms of policy prescriptions, Bergen's recommendations are modest. He calls for better "day after" planning, meaning that commanders should have clear exit strategies before launching operations. He also urges future presidents to accurately assess the type of war they are entering, whether it is a limited counter‑terrorism strike or a broader nation‑building effort. While these suggestions are sensible, they stop short of offering a comprehensive roadmap for how the United States might restructure its counter‑terrorism architecture in the post‑ISIS era.
Jonathan Schanzer, executive director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, praised the book's thorough research but echoed concerns about its limited scope. He noted that a fuller historical perspective could help lawmakers and the public understand why the United States has struggled to translate tactical victories into lasting strategic success. As the United States prepares for the 2024 elections, the legacy of the war on terror remains a potent issue for candidates on both sides, influencing debates over defense spending, veterans' care and the balance between security and civil liberties.
All the Presidents' Wars arrives at a moment when the United States and its allies are reassessing the long‑term costs of counter‑terrorism. For readers in Washington, Ottawa and beyond, Bergen's chronicle offers a cautionary tale about the dangers of mission creep, the perils of under‑estimating adversaries and the political fallout that follows prolonged conflict. Whether the book will shape future policy debates remains to be seen, but its detailed accounting of a quarter‑century of war provides a valuable reference point for anyone trying to make sense of America's ongoing struggle with terrorism.